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THE "THIN CORPORATION" PROBLEM
The "thin corporation" problem was annexed to the "curtail-
ment of tax avoidance" structure through dictum in John Kelley
Co. v. Commissioner when the court stated:
As material amounts of capital were invested in stock, we need not
consider the effect of extreme situations such as nominal stock invest-
ments and an obviously excessive debt structure.1
The Commissioner promptly applied this language to corporate
financing, thereby causing definite tax consequences Since then
the abundance of comment on the subject of "thin incorporation"
has been exceeded only by the uncertainty in the field. The Com-
missioner's treatment of thin capitalization leaves the tax con-
sultant unable to use the thinly organized corporation confidently
as a tax-planning measure. Because of this confusion Treasury
Regulations should be forthcoming' and one commentator notes that
a recent "thin corporation" decision, Gooding Amusement Co.,
could well result in "fGooding regulations" similar to the "Clifford
regulations" in the short-term trust field.'
I. DEFINITION AND ADVANTAGES
A "thin corporation" is one in which the capital is supplied
primarily by loans from its operators rather than by stock invest-
ment.' This type of financing is particularly advantageous to the
corporate taxpayer because it can deduct amounts paid to its share-
holders as interest on indebtedness," whereas the same amounts
paid as dividends would not be deductible.' But it is also advantage-
ous to the individual taxpayer as the payment on the principal
of the notes is treated as nontaxable return of capital.' The in-
dividual taxpayer is further favored with the possibility of a
business bad debt deduction." The aforementioned financing is of
'326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946).
'Swoby Corp., 9 T.C. 887 (1947).
'Anderson, "Thin" Corporate Capitalization, 1957 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 35.
'Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
'Rabin, The "Clifford Case" of the Thin Corporation, 34 Taxes 282 (1956).
'2 CCH 1958 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. para. 2377.277.
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 163 (a), Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 5 23(b), 53 Stat. 12.
'The corporate saving far outweighs the nominal exclusion allowed the shareholder for
dividends received, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 116(a), and the credit against his tax, Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, S 34(a), particularly in close family-type corporations.
' See Seidman, The Unexpected, Untimely and Uninvited Dividend, 36 Taxes 166 (1958),
where the author points out that a tax-neutral loan payment can become a tax-disastrous
redemption of stock if the Internal Revenue Service characterizes debt as equity. He sug-
gests that a questionable loan not be repaid until the Internal Revenue Service has passed
on the deduction of interest payable on the "loan" by the corporation.5
°Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 166, 1211, 1212.
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dubious value today, however, as the Commissioner constantly
characterizes this type of debt as equity."1
II. DEBT-EQUITY RATIO
A major consideration in this area is the perplexing debt-
equity ratio. Its ultimate effect is not clearly conveyed by the
cases, although many commentators speculate as to its importance.
It is definitely one of the factors to be considered in a "thin cor-
poration" problem"1 and perhaps the most important factor. Ap-
parently the Commissioner includes both capital and surplus in
"equity" and includes as "debt" all indebtedness with priority
equal to or greater than the purported shareholder loans. 3 The
determination of this ratio requires the application of real values
in lieu of artificial par or book values."' Although very contro-
versial, a ratio of debt to equity of 3 /2 to 1 or lower seemingly
will be upheld." Many commentators believe a 2 to 1 ratio is wiser,
being safer and yet still permitting the advantages."8 Many in-
dustries require a higher debt financing because of the very nature
of their operations and this fact further prevents the establish-
ment of a definite ratio for all businesses." Possibly the most reliable
advice is imparted by the commentators who suggest that the
presumably safe 3 2 to 1 ratio be used as a rule of thumb and
not as an infallible guide.'
"Kraft Foods Co., 21 T.C. 513 (1954), rev'd, 232 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1956); Good-
ing Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956); Estate of
Herbert B. Miller, 24 T.C. 923 (1955), rev'd, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956); R. M. Gunn,
25 T.C. 424 (1955), aft'd, 244 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1957).
1 ISsidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31 (1951), aff'd, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951); Ruspyn Corp.,
18 T.C. 769 (1952), acq., 1952-2 Cum. Bull. 3; Estate of Herbert B. Miller, 24 T.C. 923
(1955), rev'd, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956); Schlesinger, Acceptable Capital Structures:
How Thin Is Too Thin?, 5 U. Fla. L. Rev. 355 (1952).
" Comment, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 1054 (1955). See Sheldon Tauber, 24 T.C. 179 (1955).
'Kraft Foods Co., 21 T.C. 513 (1954), rev'd, 232 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1956).
15 This is due to the Commissioner's acquiescence in the case of Ruspyn Corp., 18 T.C.
769 (1952), acq., 1952-2 Cum. Bull. 3, which upheld a 3Y2 to 1 ratio. See Treusch,
Corporate Distributions and Adjustments: Recent Case Reminders of Some Old Problems
Under the New Code, 32 Taxes 1023 (1954), in which are listed approximately twenty
cases holding various corporations to be inadequately capitalized. See also Stanford, What Is
Adequate Capitalization?, 31 Taxes 231 (1953), which lists thirteen cases involving thin
corporations and Schlesinger, supra note 12, which contains a chart of thin corporation
cases . &W
'S Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 Taxes 830 (1956); Poin-
dexter, Thin Corporations, 35 Taxes 880 (1957); Schlesinger, supra note 12.
"2 ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. S 232 (Feb. 1954 Draft); Anderson, supra note 3;
Spanbock, Carro, and Katz, Nourishing the Thin Corporation, 34 Taxes 687 (1956); H. B.
Miller v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956). See also Greene, Corporate Organ-
ization and Distributions, 6 J. Taxation 262 (1957), in which it is noted that the ABA Tax
Section recommends that the Internal Revenue Code be changed to provide that a 10 to 1
debt-equity ratio will not be too thin.
s Kahn, Incorporating the Going Business: How to Find the Method with the Least
Tax Cost, 6 J. Taxation 72 (1957); Treusch, supra note 15.
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III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to the apparent necessity of a low debt-equity
ratio, it is essential that the instrument evidencing the corporate
debt be strictly "debt" in form and not a "hybrid security." It
is important to remember, however, that form alone will not
ultimately produce the desired result; substance is the controlling
factor. But even so, the instruments and all related matter must
be form perfect in order to have a "fighting chance." Hence there
should be (1) an unconditional obligation to pay a sum certain
in money, (2) a definite maturity date, (3) a specific time for
the interest payment and the actual payment of interest whether
or not there are earnings, (4) no subordination to the claims of
other creditors, and (5) correct debt form in the corporate books
and all related matter." Also, the shareholder's debt should be
disproportionate to his equity interest."0 Relatively recent cases
indicate a possible need for a business purpose,21 and there has been
mention of requiring the introdution of new capital."2 Intent is
also essential in this area. 3 The taxpayer's intent is always found
so as to support the court's holding, and it often appears that the
holding is determined prior to the intent. As pointed out by one
commentator, the Tax Court apparently feels free to determine
the requisite intent by hindsight." The cases state that the "thin
corporation" decisions must necessarily be decided on their own
facts since, as a practical matter, no two cases are factually alike.'
The preceding paragraph thus points out the essentiality of precise
form, a reasonable ratio, and a business purpose if the taxpayer
intends to remain out of court or at least have a strong possibility
of prevailing if forced into court action.
IV. INCONSISTENCIES
The reasoning of the courts is very inconsistent and vague;
perhaps the ultimate outcome of a "thin corporation" decision will
"SSchlesinger, supra note 12; 2 ALI Fed. Income Tax Star. S 232 (Feb. 1954 Draft);
Treusch, supra note 15.
"01432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. 1158 (1945), aff'd, 160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947);
Spanbock, Carro, and Katz, supra note 17.
"
5Kraft Foods Co., 21 T.C. 513 (1954), rev'd, 232 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1956); Good-
ing Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954), afftd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956); Estate of
Herbert B. Miller, 24 T.C. 923 (1955), rev'd, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956). See also
Treusch, supra note 15.
"Kraft Foods Co., 21 T.C. 513 (1954), rev'd, 232 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1956), 11 Sw.
L.J. 260 (1957).
"Estate of Herbert B. Miller, 24 T.C. 923 (1955); Associated Investors, Inc. v.
United States, 57-1 CCH U.S.T.C. para. 9396 (1956).
" Poindexter, supra note 16.
"Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956); Associated
Investors, Inc. v. United States, supra note 23; Poindexter, supra note 16.
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depend on the particular circuit in spite of the constant statement
that each case depends upon its own facts. An example of the
confused reasoning is found in the Tax Court's opinion in the
Gooding case. The court states at 418:
There is nothing reprehensible in casting one's transactions in such a
fashion as to produce the least tax. The courts have often reaffirmed
this view [citing authority]. On the other hand, tax avoidance will
not be permitted if the transaction or relationship on which such avoid-
ance depends is a "sham" or lacks genuineness.
Later in the same opinion at 421 the court asserts:
The fact the . . . [petitioner] may have had no intention of distribut-
ing earnings under the guise of discharging debts is immaterial.
Further at 422 quoting from McGuire v. Commissioner:"'
'Neither artifice, subterfuge, or bad faith need be present . . . , for
as we read the law a taxpayer may well act with the utmost good
purpose and without evil intent and yet his transactions may in effect
be the equivalent of the distribution of a taxable dividend.'
The above opinion initially indicates that tax avoidance is per-
missible unless there is "sham," but then states that tax avoidance
is disallowed regardless of purpose. This leads to the conclusion that
if done for tax avoidance, whether genuine or not, the transaction
can be struck down.
Reasoning such as the above and the Tax Court's holdings
have aroused courts of appeals and commentators alike.' In Estate
of Herbert B. Miller" the Ninth Circuit averred:
We know of no rule which permits the Commissioner to dictate what
portion of a corporation's operations shall be provided for by equity
financing rather than by debt.
And in a well-reasoned opinion by the Fifth Circuit it was declared:
It would obviously work an unwarranted interference by the courts
in ordinary and perfectly proper business procedures for us to say
that there can be established, as a matter of hindsight, a ratio of
stockholder-owned debt to the capital of the debtor corporation. No
stockholder could safely advance money to strengthen the faltering
steps of the corporation ...if he is faced with the danger of having
the Commissioner, with the backing of the courts, say 'he had no right
to launch a corporate business without investing in it all the money
" 84 F.2d 431, 432 (7th Cir. 1936).
2' One commentator envisions: "It might be fair to assume, therefore, that any closed
corporation that has borrowed money from its shareholders, whether in the form of bonds
or notes or loans, has an excellent chance of ending up in the court." Rabin, The "Clif-
ford Case" of the Thin Corporation, 34 Taxes 282, 285 (1956).
"239 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1956).
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it needed, and investing it in the way that is most disadvantageous to
himself, both as relates to taxpayer and as to other creditors.''
Disagreement such as the foregoing should accelerate the advent
of government regulations.
The Commissioner is perhaps too inclined towards obtaining
additional revenue and not sufficiently concerned with the effect
his action could have on corporate financing. The court of appeals
in the Sixth Circuit stated:
The essential difference between a stockholder and a creditor is that
the stockholder's intention is to embark upon the corporate adventure,
taking the risks of loss attendant upon it, so that he may enjoy the
chances of profit. The creditor, on the other hand, does not intend to
take such risks so far as they may be avoided, but merely to lend his
capital to others who do intend to take them.3
This is perhaps technically correct. It is not entirely accurate, how-
ever, as there are many other considerations involved. An operator,
although desiring to retain his stockholder control, will often be-
come technically a creditor so as to take advantage of favorable
provisions in the Bankruptcy Act as well as in the Internal Revenue
Code.' Conversely, a lender to a corporation often will demand
some of the stock so that he can keep abreast of corporate affairs."'
The Commissioner's treatment of corporate financing has met
with disfavor among commentators. One article declares:
Corporations and their stockholders should be entitled to issue what-
ever classes of securities and in whatever proportions they may choose,
within reason, regardless of tax consequences."
And, as asserted in the Tax Fortnighter:
If the stockholders have a right to advance any amounts to their cor-
poration as true indebtedness, what provision of law limits the amount
or ratio of such indebtedness?"
The American Law Institute protests thusly:
Whether there should be a limitation upon the amount of indebtedness
held pro rata by shareholders . . . has been the subject of disagreement,
but it is our conclusion that there should be no such limitation.3'
"Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1955).
"United States v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990, 993 (6th Cit. 1943).Si Of course, as a practical matter, this is only possible in a closely held corporation.
a Boughner and Greene, Corporate Organization and Distributions, 5 J. Taxation 147(1956).
3 Manley, What To Do About the New Intent Test in Thin Corporations, 5 J. Taxa-
tion 379 (1956).
1956 Annual Tax Fortnighter 1346.
"2 ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. 5 232 (Feb. 1954 Draft).
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It appears that the only semblance of agreement is among the
critics, who do not approve of the Commissioner's conduct in thus
"piercing the corporate veil." Businessmen undoubtedly desire to fi-
nance their interests in such a manner as is most advantageous to
them and should be able to do so without adverse tax effects, if with-
in legal and reasonable bounds. Obviously no outside creditor would
advance money or goods to a firm that was too thinly capitalized,
and therefore he is protected in this sense.
V. FACT v. LAW
The courts of appeals uphold decisions from most administra-
tive bodies if the decisions are supported by "substantial evidence
on the whole record," but this rule does not apply to Tax Court
decisions. The Internal Revenue Code expressly provides that the
courts of appeals have reviewable jurisdiction just as if the decision
were rendered by a district court in a civil action without a jury."6
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that findings of fact
rendered by a court without a jury "shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous.""7 If this "clearly erroneous" rule is strictly ap-
plied, the problems affronting the taxpayer will surely be multiplied.
The Tax Court noticeably backs up the Commissioner as a general
rule in these "thin corporation" cases and it is quite possible that
the very important criterion-intent-will be considered a ques-
tion of fact, thereby almost precluding the courts of appeals from
reversing the Tax Court."8 As is generally conceded, the courts of
appeals can devise ways to circumvent rules and reach almost any
conclusion desired, but nevertheless the "clearly erroneous" test
can further harass the already frustrated taxpayer.
VI. PROBLEM AIDS
The following discussion is to be prefaced with the caveat
that none of these proposed aids are "tried and true" and also
with the observation that this writer sees no real merit in any of
SInt. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 7482(a) specifies: "The United States Courts of Appeals
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tax Court ... in the same
manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried
without a jury."
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a): "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . ..
the court shall find the facts . . . .Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous . . .."
SSSee Crown Iron Works Co. v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1957) in which
the court affirms, "The question of intent, if at all doubtful either because of a conflict in
the evidence or because different inferences reasonably may be drawn from undisputed facts,
is a question of fact for the trial court, and only becomes a question of law for a re-.
viewing court if the evidence is all one way as to leave no doubt as to the fact." (Em-
phasis added.) It is obvious that reasoning such as the above will resolve intent is a question
of fact in the majority of the cases.
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them as dependable and practically workable solutions. In addition
to having all instruments, accounts, entries, etc., strictly "debt"
in form, a reasonable ratio, and a business purpose, there are other
possible ways to substantiate the taxpayer's position. One often
mentioned method is securing the loan, but this is of doubtful
value. (Of course any further evidence of debt is of some help
in this area.) Another aid is the delaying of loans for a period,
with the stockholder possibly renting assets to the corporation,
taking depreciation, and eventually capital gains; 9 while not strictly
a thin corporation solution, this is perhaps a good tax-savings device.
Of course, the delay itself cannot be expected to ward off the
Commissioner. The often proposed solution whereby the share-
holder merely guarantees the loan was perhaps fatally dealt with
in Putnam v. Commissioner"° and will not be considered here.
Another possible solution is an unconditional sale of the stockholder's
debt interest to an unrelated third person. This sale will more than
likely take place near maturity as a practical matter.41 Many other
suggestions have been proffered, but this writer fails to see the
practical value of any of them. Perhaps the best solutions have
been either (1) to avoid the Tax Court" or (2) to be in the pro-
per circuit."
VII. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit is perhaps presently the best circuit in the
eyes of the taxpayer in which to litigate a "thin corporation" prob-
lem. This circuit in the Rowan case strongly asserted:
It is entirely within the competence of Congress to provide by statute
for such ratio if it deems it advisable or necessary within the scheme
of Federal Taxation. It is not within our province to do so. Nor would
it further the desirable end of certainty in taxes for us to do so."
In accord with this view is one commentator's opinion dealing with
the Commissioner's treatment of the debt-equity question:
It is submitted that such changes should be made by statute rather
than by courts. Whether the change is accomplished by statute or the
courts, it would certainly not be equitable to apply it retroactively
"0 Anderson, "Thin" Corporate Capitalization, 1957 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 35.
40 352 U.S. 82 (1956). But see Kanter, Supreme Court Kills Ordinary-Loss Deduction
on Guaranteed Loans; Uncertainty Remains, 6 J. Taxation 66 (1957). Also noted in
Bittker, supra note 16, was the thought that the substance-form theory would at the
least cause guaranteed loans to be scrutinized closely by the Commissioner.
41 Manley, supra note 32.
41 Poindexter, supra note 16.
41 See Rabin, supra note 27.
44219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).
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in view of the Commissioner's acquiescence in the ratio of debt to
equity test.45
This writer agrees with the above views but feels that even if regu-
lations or statutes are used in settling the debt-equity ratio the Com-
missioner may still classify debt as equity by an "intent" test or
some other similar test. The only path out of this intricate maze is
a Supreme Court decision, Treasury regulations, or an amendment
to the Internal Revenue Code, which will cover the entire problem
rather than merely the ratio facet.
Marshall S. McCrea, Jr.
"Manley, supra note 32.
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